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Abstract At CHES 2009, Renauld, Standaert and
Veyrat-Charvillon introduced a new kind of attack
called Algebraic Side-Channel Attacks (ASCA). They
showed that side-channel information leads to effective
algebraic attacks. These results are mostly experiments
since strongly based on the use of a SAT solver. This ar-
ticle presents a theoretical study in order to explain and
to characterize the algebraic phase of these attacks. We
study more general algebraic attacks based on Gro¨bner
methods. We show that the complexity of the Gro¨bner
basis computations in these attacks depends on a new
notion of algebraic immunity defined in this paper, and
on the distribution of the leakage information of the
cryptosystem. We also study two examples of common
leakage models: the Hamming weight and the Hamming
distance models. For instance the study in the case of
the Hamming weight model gives that the probabil-
ity of obtaining at least 64 (resp. 130) linear relations
is about 50% for the substitution layer of PRESENT
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(resp. AES). Moreover if the S-boxes are replaced by
functions maximizing the new algebraic immunity cri-
terion then the algebraic attacks (Gro¨bner and SAT)
are intractable. From this theoretical study, we also de-
duce an invariant which can be easily computed from a
given S-Box and provides a sufficient condition of weak-
ness under an ASCA. This new invariant does not re-
quire any sophisticated algebraic techniques to be de-
fined and computed. Thus, for cryptographic engineers
without an advanced knowledge in algebra (e.g. Gro¨b-
ner basis techniques), this invariant may represent an
interesting tool for rejecting weak S-boxes.
1 Introduction
Algebraic Side Channel Attacks (ASCA) are a new kind
of attack recently introduced in [RSVC09] by Renauld,
Standaert and Veyrat-Charvillon. It is a natural com-
bination of classical algebraic cryptanalysis and side
channel attacks which take full advantage of both clas-
sical attacks. It should be mentioned that several meth-
ods combining side channel and algebraic attacks (see
[Bog07,BKP08] for the first algebraic collision attacks)
or differential attacks (see [SWP03,HP06,Bog08]) have
already been suggested. As for these methods, the main
idea of ASCA is to begin with an on-line phase where
leakage information is recorded by a side channel, and
to end with a powerful off-line phase where this data is
used by algebraic cryptanalysis to recover the key. In
contrary to standard Differential Power Analysis, the
goal of the on-line phase is not to recover directly a
bit of the key but it is only to catch a lot of partial
information on the intermediate data manipulated dur-
ing the encryption. Thus, all the leakages of all the
cipher rounds are potentially useful. Contrary to the
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articles [SWP03,SLFP04,HP06,Bog07,BKP08,Bog08,
MME10], ASCA could succeed with the observation
of a single encrypted plaintext and would work with
completely masked implementations. During this on-
line phase, a leakage model is selected, for example
a common leakage model is the Hamming weight of
data transiting on a bus (see for instance [CJRR99,
ABDM00] for a discussion of this model). Next, the
off-line phase makes use of the collected leakage infor-
mation in an algebraic attack. In the present study, the
side channel information is assumed to be reliable for
use in the algebraic attack phase, which is not the case
with real measures because of the presence of noise.
Even though recent works have shown how algebraic
approaches may deal with errors ([OKPW10,AC10]),
our goal is to start to explain and to understand the
efficiency of ASCA, and more precisely the algebraic
phase of ASCA with reliable leakage information. This
algebraic attack phase consists of modeling the cryp-
tosystem and the leakage model by a system of polyno-
mial equations. Solving this system is equivalent to re-
covering the bits of the key. In classical algebraic crypt-
analysis, solving the system of equations representing a
modern block cipher remains a source of speculation be-
cause of the complexity of solving such polynomial sys-
tems. On the contrary, the system of equations obtained
with the algebraic collision attacks ([Bog07,BKP08])
has been well detailed so that the complexity of resolu-
tion of such systems is well understood. On the other
hand, in the ASCA context, the leakage model seems to
provide enough information to efficiently solve in prac-
tice the system of equations, but the apparent simplic-
ity of this solving step remained unexplained and its
computational complexity was not enough analyzed.
In [RS09] and [RSVC09], algebraic side-channel at-
tacks are evaluated against 8-bit implementations of
PRESENT and AES. The main leakage model stud-
ied is the Hamming weight model. Thus, the authors of
[RS09,RSVC09] (as in [HP06]) assume the knowledge
of the Hamming weights of some intermediate compu-
tations. The system of equations representing the block
cipher and the leakage model is translated into a sat-
isfiability problem and solved by a SAT solver. Un-
der these assumptions, this attack seems very power-
ful. Indeed, the key is always recovered in less than
one minute if all the 8-bit Hamming weights after the
XORs (in AddRoundKey and MixColumns functions)
and after the substitution layers are known for a 31-
round PRESENT and for a 10-round AES. When fewer
Hamming weights are known, the number of consec-
utive rounds with Hamming weights is an important
criterion for a successful attack. There are also some
effective attacks in unknown plaintext/ciphertext sit-
uations or against masked implementations. It is clear
that the known Hamming weights allow to exclude most
of the possible values of the key, however, the success
rate of these attacks depends on several parameters: the
amount of available information, the leakage function or
the shape of the system of equations. All these results
are also very dependent on the heuristics used in the
SAT solver, and so the experiments are very difficult to
explain when SAT solver techniques are used.
The main goal of this article is to explain the ef-
fectiveness of this attack, to describe the criterion of
success and therefore to find the theoretical conditions
to prevent algebraic side channel attacks. To achieve
this goal, Gro¨bner techniques are used instead of a SAT
solver because of their computation without heuristics
and so, more stable and more understandable. We also
assume the same hypothesis as in [RS09,RSVC09], par-
ticularly that an initial on-line phase provides a se-
quence of leakage information, and we only focus on
the algebraic cryptanalysis phase. Furthermore, we do
not discuss about side channel countermeasures, and
we refer to [RS09,RSVC09] for detailed discussions. We
show in section 2 that the complexity of the Gro¨bner
basis computation in these attacks depends on a new
notion of algebraic immunity and on the distribution
of leakage information. This Algebraic Immunity with
Leakage is defined by the degree and also the number
of lowest degree relations which are given by a black
box (S-Boxes, Key derivation, etc) and its leakage in-
formation. This new algebraic immunity is completely
related to the complexity of the Gro¨bner basis compu-
tation and thus, represents a good criterion for effective
Gro¨bner attacks. From this theoretical study and this
new criterion, we deduce a new invariant, which could
also be connected to SAT solvers efficiency. For a given
block cipher, this invariant, denoted by NB , is easily
computed by a local study of the black boxes B defining
the cryptosystem. In contrary to the Algebraic Immu-
nity with Leakage, this computation does not require
any knowledge of advanced algebra which may be more
useful for cryptographic engineers who are not fluent
with Gro¨bner basis techniques. More precisely, if we de-
note by B the black box, L the leakage model, l a value
of the function L, and n the bus size, then the invariant
is the function NB(l) giving the cardinality of the cor-
responding set {x ∈ Fn2 s.t. L(x,B(x)) = l}. We prove
that the number of linear relations given by the leakage
l is greater or equal than 2n+1−NB(l) (in practice, this
bound is often achieved). Thus, from this new invari-
ant, we deduce a sufficient condition for the weakness of
a black box under a Gro¨bner attack with leakage. This
condition corresponds to the case where the black box
is such that NB(l) is small for a lot of values of l. We
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verify this condition in practice by using Gro¨bner ba-
sis techniques and some of the best SAT solvers. Thus,
this invariant may be seen as a general algebraic suf-
ficient condition (independent of the solving strategy)
for an effective algebraic side channel attack. Even if
this invariant does not provide a theoretical necessary
condition of weakness, we successfully describe several
scenarios of unsuccessful Gro¨bner and SAT solver at-
tacks when NB(l) is large. For example, if the S-boxes
are replaced by functions maximizing the function NB
then both algebraic attacks become impractical. The
same holds when all leakage data maximizes NB .
From this new theoretical point of view, we analyze
the precedent results on ASCA which were heuristic.
To simplify and to keep the point of view of [RS09,
RSVC09], we mostly study the 8-bit Hamming weight
leakage, but we also consider the Hamming distance
which is a more general model. The results presented
in Section 3.2 and in Annex A show that, with the Ham-
ming weight model, the AES, PRESENT, CAMELLIA
and SMS4 S-boxes are very weak with respect to this
invariant: NB is often small and the number of linear
equations is on average 8 per S-box. With the Ham-
ming distance model, ASCA is much more difficult and
we show that, in this case, NB is often large and the
number of linear equations is on average between 1 and
2 per S-box. The local study of these S-boxes shows
that these two models of leakage information can be
used to partly linearize the polynomial system of equa-
tions. Moreover, if NB is very small then few input or
output bits of the S-box can be recovered. In section 4,
these local results are used to explain the recovery of
the key bits. Especially in the case of consecutive leak-
age in the Hamming weight model, the subkey bits can
be easily deduced from previously recovered bits. Or
else, we show that the system of equations representing
the block cipher and the Hamming weight information
contains enough linear equations to be efficiently solved:
the probability of obtaining at least 64 (resp. 130) lin-
ear relations is about 50% for PRESENT (resp. AES)
for example. Moreover, we show that if the number of
rounds increases, the number of linear relations which
provide subkey bit increase (see Section 4.3). Conse-
quently, this work fully explains the efficiency of the
attack. Thanks to this understanding, an efficient solv-
ing strategy is developed for Gro¨bner attacks (Section
4). In the case of the Hamming distance model, the
attacks are much less efficient because NB is larger in
average, and the expected number of linear equations
is very low (see Section 3.3). In section 5, the condi-
tions for preventing algebraic side channel attacks are
also discussed, and it seems that one of the safest way
to design a block cipher resistant against all kinds of
attacks is to increase the bus size.
2 Algebraic Cryptanalysis and side channel
information
The basic principle of Algebraic Cryptanalysis is to
model a cryptographic primitive by a set of algebraic
equations over a finite field. The system of equations
is constructed in such a way as to have a correspon-
dence between the solutions of this system, and the
secret information of the cryptographic primitive (for
instance, the secret key of a block cipher). There are
different ways to solve such a polynomial system : SAT
solver, Gro¨bner basis, XSL([CP02]) etc. In this arti-
cle, we particularly use the Gro¨bner basis method, a
powerful tool for solving a polynomial system. We refer
to [BFS04,Bar04,BFSY05] for a discussion on the com-
plexity of Gro¨bner basis computation of overdetermined
algebraic equations over finited fields. The Fauge`re’s F4
and F5 [Fau99,Fau02] algorithms are the most efficient
algorithms to compute Gro¨bner basis, so in our exper-
iments we used the efficient implementation of F4 by
Magma software [BCP97]. These algorithms have been
successfully applied against a number of multivariate
schemes [FJ03,FP06a,FP06b,FdVP08] and in stream
cipher cryptanalysis [CM03,Ars05], but they stay un-
practical against bloc ciphers [CP02,CL05]. Indeed, the
size of the corresponding algebraic system is so huge
(thousand of variables and/or equations with high de-
gree) that nobody is able to predict correctly the com-
plexity of solving such polynomial systems. The de-
gree of these equations stay high because of non-linear
substitution-box layers (S-Boxes) and the multitude of
rounds. One of the main goals of algebraic attacks is
to describe these S-Boxes by low degree equations. The
number of such equations gives a criterion to evaluate
the block cipher resistance against algebraic attacks and
it is called Algebraic Immunity ([AA05,AF05,Ars05,
AK06,FM07,Car09,Car10]).
In algebraic side channel attack, we also assume the
knowledge of additional information obtained by side
channel, for instance Hamming weights of intermediate
values. In the polynomial system modeling of our prob-
lem we take into account this assumption. In particular,
we see each round of the block cipher as successive black
boxes operating on n-bit data (i.e. n is the size of the
bus). From the knowledge of the polynomial systems
representing such a black box and the corresponding
Hamming weight leakages, one can model the complete
block cipher with leakages as a block diagonal system of
equations (each block corresponding to a round). This
definition of the model by splitting the different steps of
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size of n bits is used in our strategy for solving the en-
tire system and it turns out that this algebraic system
updated with equations corresponding to the leakage is
easier to solve in practice. We will show in this section
that the presence of this additional information may
give rise to a number of independent linear relations.
These relations enable us to mount an effective alge-
braic attack and that leads us to define a new notion of
Algebraic Immunity with Leakage.
From now on, to make this study more general, the
S-boxes, or any vectorial boolean function is seen as
a black box, denoted by B in the following. Let n be
the bus size of B, X1, . . . , Xn and Y1, . . . , Yn be respec-
tively its input and output bits. To restrict the study
to solutions with coefficients in the field F2 (and not
in its algebraic closure F2), we always add the set of
polynomials SField Eq. = {X2i −Xi, Y 2i − Yi, 1 ≤ i ≤ n}
(corresponding to the classical field equations) into the
polynomial systems. We will denote by IField Eq. the
ideal of F2[X1, . . . , Xn, Y1, . . . , Yn] generated by the set
SField Eq.. Finally, the subset SB = {F1, . . . , FkB} ⊂
F2[X1, . . . , Xn, Y1, . . . , Yn] is the finite set of Boolean
functions defining the outputs of B as a (explicit or
implicit) function of its inputs.
2.1 Algebraic Immunity for Block ciphers
The notion of Algebraic Immunity often refers to
stream ciphers and boolean functions, but in this ar-
ticle, we make reference to the Algebraic Immunity ex-
tended to boolean vectorial functions (sometimes called
“graph algebraic immunity”). This definition slightly
varies from one article to the next. Thus, we first remind
the definition of the Algebraic Immunity which we are
going to use and we give an algorithm to compute it
(see [AA05,AF05,Ars05,AK06,FM07,Car09,Car10]).
The Algebraic Immunity is defined as the lowest de-
gree of algebraic relations of a Boolean vectorial func-
tion. More formally, let B : Fn2 → Fn2 be a black box and
IB ⊂ F2[X1, . . . , Xn, Y1, . . . , Yn] the ideal generated by
the equations representing B and the field equations:
IB = 〈SB ∪ SField Eq.〉
Definition 1 The Algebraic Immunity of B is defined
by AI(B) = min{deg(P ), P ∈ IB \ IField Eq.}
Remark 1 The number of such lowest degree relations
is also an important invariant related to IB , and it is
always computed at the same time as the Algebraic
Immunity.
To obtain the Algebraic Immunity of a black box B, we
could compute a Gro¨bner basis of IB with respect to a
graded order([AF05]):
Theorem 1 The reduced Gro¨bner basis GB of IB with
respect to a graded order contains a linear basis of the
lowest relations of B (i.e. the polynomials P ∈ IB such
that deg(P ) = AI(B)).
Proof Every f ∈ IB is reduced to zero by a Gro¨bner ba-
sis of IB . Thus, there is a polynomial g ∈ GB such that
the leading monomial LM(g) of g divides LM(f). As we
have a graded monomial order, deg(g) = deg(LM(g))
and deg(f) = deg(LM(f)). Thus, deg(g) ≤ deg(f) and
we prove that GB contains a linear generated family of
the lowest relations of B. Then the definition of a re-
duced Gro¨bner basis implies that the linear generated
family is a linearly independent family. uunionsq
Example 1 The Algebraic Immunity of the function cal-
culating the inverse over F28 (e.g. AES S-box) equals 2.
Indeed, the inverse function is represented by a set of
39 quadratic equations over F2 ([CP02]) as well as over
F28 ([Ars05]).
2.2 Algebraic Immunity of S-boxes with Leakage
In the previous section, the concept of Algebraic Immu-
nity is defined as the lowest degree of algebraic relations
of a Boolean vectorial function. In the ASCA context,
we are looking for the lowest degree relations of B with
leakage information (e.g. Hamming weights, Hamming
distances). Therefore, we need to introduce a slightly
different notion of Algebraic Immunity to take the leak-
age into account. To do so, for every value l of the leak-
age model, we consider the ideal Il of F2[X1, . . . , Xn,
Y1, . . . , Yn] generated by the equations representing B,
the field equations SField Eq. and by Ll the set of equa-
tions representing the leakage information l, namely:
Il = 〈SB ∪ Ll ∪ SField Eq.〉 .
From this ideal we can define this new notion of alge-
braic immunity.
Definition 2 Let B be a black box and l the value
of the leakage model L. The Algebraic Immunity With
Leakage, denoted by AIL(B, l), is defined by
AIL(B, l) = min{deg(P ), P ∈ Il \ IField Eq.}
The number of linearly independent relations in Il with
degree AIL(B, l) will be denoted by #AIL(B, l).
Similarly to the general notion of Algebraic Immu-
nity, the relations of lowest degree can be explicitly ob-
tained by the computation of a Gro¨bner basis of Il with
respect to a graded order (see [Ars05]).
An other important invariant related to Il is the
number of points in the associated variety V (Il), i.e.
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the set of common roots of the polynomials in Il. This
number which depends on the black box B and on the
value l of the leakage function L, is also linked to our Al-
gebraic Immunity With Leakage and it will be denoted
by NB(l):
Definition 3 NB(l) is defined as the number of points
of the variety V (Il). In other words, NB(l) is equal to
the cardinality of the set {x ∈ Fn2 s.t. L(x,B(x)) = l}
We will show in Section 3 below that AIL(B, l) is
equal to 1 in the cases of Hamming weight and Ham-
ming distance model. In this particular situation where
AIL(B, l) is equal to one (ie. there is at least one linear
equation in the Ideal Il), we prove the following relation
between #AIL(B, l) and NB(l):
Proposition 1 Let n be the bus size of B. If AIL(B, l)
is equal to 1 and NB(l) is non-zero then
NB(l) ≥ 2n+ 1−#AIL(B, l) .
Proof As observed in Definition 3, we have NB(l) =
#V (Il). Since Il contains the field polynomials, it is
radical. Its variety V (Il) is a subset of Fn2 and, from
the Nullstellensatz, we have




= dim(Span(mα : α ∈ N2n, mα /∈ LT(Il)))
From this set of generating monomials, we only keep
the set F of monomials which have a degree less than
or equal than one:
F = {m : deg(m) ≤ 1 and m /∈ LT(Il)}
We have #V (Il) ≥ dim(Span(F )). Now, let E = {m :
deg(m) ≤ 1} and G = {m : deg(m) ≤ 1 and m ∈
LT(Il)}. It is clear that F is the set of monomials in E
which are in LT(Il) and G is the set of the monomials
in E which are not in LT(Il), thus the set E is equal to
the following disjoint union E = F
⊔
G. Finally,
#V (Il) ≥ dim(Span(F ))
= dim(Span(E))− dim(Span(G))
= 2n+ 1−#AIL(B, l)
uunionsq
We have defined the Algebraic Immunity with Leak-
age and showed its relation with NB(l). In the next
section, these results will be useful to study two exam-
ples of leakage models: the Hamming weight and the
Hamming distance leakage models.
3 Two common leakage models: the Hamming
weight model and the Hamming distance model
In [RS09] and [RSVC09], algebraic side-channel attacks
are evaluated against implementations of the block ci-
phers PRESENT and AES in 8-bit PIC microcontrol-
ers. The main leakage model studied is the Hamming
weight model, that is the number of bits set to 1 be-
ing processed at a given time (see for instance [CJRR99,
ABDM00] for a discussion of this model).
Thus the authors of [RS09,RSVC09] assume the know-
ledge of the Hamming weights of some intermediate
computations. In this section, we also assume that a
first on-line phase already provided leakages as the
Hamming weights or the Hamming distances of the in-
put and output of a black box B. The Algebraic Im-
munity with Leakage is of great help to study the in-
fluence of this additional information on the system of
equations generated by B. Actually, we prove that the
Algebraic Immunity with Leakage of B with Hamming
weight model or with Hamming distance model is equal
to 1 for every possible black box B which is exception-
ally small. Moreover, we show that there are at least
two independent linear equations in the case of Ham-
ming weight model.
3.1 The system of equations corresponding to the
Hamming weight
First of all, we need to describe the system of equa-
tions representing the Hamming weight of the data x =
(x1, x2, . . . , xn) ∈ Fn2 . Note that if the Hamming weight
of x is equal to w then any product of w + 1 bits is




Xi = 0 : I ⊂ {1 . . . n} s.t. |I| = w + 1
}
and there is only one product of w bits which is 1, which









These two facts are sufficient to represent the Hamming
weight model by the system of equations
Lw = Rw ∪ Tw (1)
Example 2 For instance, the system of equations L1 =
{x1x2 = x1x3 = x1x4 = x2x3 = x2x4 = x3x4 = 0, x1 +
x2+x3+x4 = 1} is satisfied only by x = (x1 . . . x4) ∈ F42
such that HW (x) = 1 :
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The only sets Lw which contain a linear equation
are the sets Lw with w = 0 or w = 1. When w > 1,
these sets Lw do not contain linear equations.
Now that we have formulated the system of equa-
tions representing the Hamming weights, we are able
to study the Hamming weight leakage model. We will
show that the addition of these systems of equations
representing the Hamming weight to the system mod-
eling a black box B could give a lot of linear equations.
3.2 Hamming weight model leakage
We study the Algebraic Immunity With Leakage in the
case of the Hamming weight model (see Section 2.2).
So, we consider the ideal Iwin,wout of F2[X1, . . . , Xn, Y1,
. . . , Yn] generated by the equations representing B, the
field polynomials SField Eq. and by Lwin , Lwout the equa-
tions representing the Hamming weights win, wout re-
spectively (see the definition of Lw (1)), namely:
Iwin,wout = 〈Lwin ∪ Lwout ∪ SB ∪ SField Eq.〉
In this case, the Algebraic Immunity With Leakage
of the black box B with Hamming weight leakage is
denoted by AIL(B,win, wout) and the number of lin-
early independent relations in Iwin,wout with degree
AIL(B,win, wout) is denoted by #AIL(B,win, wout).
We now prove that AIL(B,win, wout) = 1, and
#AIL(B,win, wout) ≥ 2, i.e. that Iwin,wout contains at
least two independent linear polynomials. This result is
a consequence of the fact that there is always a linear
relation in the ideal generated by the equations describ-
ing the Hamming weight. Although these two linear re-
lations are not really useful in an algebraic attack, this
result shows that the situation is completely different
with the classical algebraic immunity.
Lemma 1 Let w ∈ {0, . . . , n}. The ideal Ihw(w) ⊂
F2[X1, . . . , Xn], generated by Lw (1) and by SField Eq.,
always contains the linear polynomial
X0 + · · ·+Xn + (w mod 2) (2)
Proof The system of equations Lw(1) defines the set
V (w) = {x ∈ Fn2 s.t. HW (x) = w} = HW−1(w).
Then, the radical ([CLO07]) ideal Ihw(w) contains all
polynomials vanishing on V (w) (which is the variety
of Ihw(w) over F2). Clearly, the linear polynomial (2)
vanishes on V (w), hence it must be in Ihw(w). uunionsq
We can now prove the following result :
Proposition 2 Let G be the Gro¨bner basis of the ideal
Iwin,wout for a graded monomial order. Then G contains
at least 2 independent linear polynomials.
Proof With the same notation as in lemma 1, we could
note that there exist (win, wout) ∈ N2 such that
Iwin,wout = IB + Ihw(win) + Ihw(wout). According to
Lemma 1,
f = X1 + · · ·+Xn + (win mod 2) ∈ Iwin,wout
f ′ = Y1 + · · ·+ Yn + (wout mod 2) ∈ Iwin,wout
then there is g ∈ G such that the leading monomial
LM(g) of g divides LM(f), the leading monomial of f .
As Iwin,wout is a proper ideal, LM(g) = LM(f) = Xi,
i depending on order, and as the monomial order is a
graded order, g is a linear polynomial. The same holds
for f ′. uunionsq
Thus, the Algebraic Immunity with Leakage is al-
ways 1 and there are at least 2 independent linear poly-
nomials when Hamming weight equations are added to
the system of equations corresponding to B. It is quite
natural that these two linear relations are in the ideal
Il since they correspond to information added by the
leakage. But, it is important to see that these results
are general. They do not depend on the bus size n and
on the black box B. What is more interesting is the
fact that, when the black box is fixed as a S-box, the
number of linear independent relations is (in general)
larger than 2 (see Section 6 and Appendix A). The aim
of the analysis done in this paper is to study the impact
of these linear relations on an algebraic attack. For in-
stance, when the Hamming weight of the inputs is equal
to 0, we have X1 = X2 = · · · = Xn = 0, and the Yi are
given by (y1, . . . , yn) = B(x1, . . . , xn) = B(0, . . . , 0). In
this case, the Gro¨bner basis computation gives:
I0,wout = IB + Ihw(0) + Ihw(wout) = IB + Ihw(0)
= 〈X1, . . . , Xn, Y1 + y1, . . . , Yn + yn〉
which means that all the Xi and Yi are fixed by the
resolution. In this case, the number of independent lin-
ear equations is maximal. This (trivial) example corre-
sponds to the case where the input (or output) is fixed
by the leakage. These are the only cases where one can
show that there are more than two linear relations in Il
without fixing the black box B.
When the black box B is fixed, the number of in-
dependent linear equations depends on the Hamming
weight ordered pair of the input and output, and we
already show with Proposition 1 that it is linked to the
number of points which satisfy this couple. Thus, NB
(Definition 3) in the case of the Hamming weight model
is denoted by NB(win, wout) and it is explicitly given
by
NB(win, wout) = #(HW−1(win) ∩B−1(HW−1(wout)))
= #{x ∈ Fn2 s.t. HW (x) = win and HW (B(x)) = wout}
Analysis of the Algebraic Side Channel Attack 7
Remark 2 NB(win, wout) is related to the likelihood
P(HW (x) = win and HW (B(x)) = wout) of the pair
(win, wout). Indeed, if we assume an equiprobability dis-
tribution of input bytes, this likelihood equals
2−nNB(win, wout).
In the particular case of an 8-bit bus size, Proposi-
tion 1 gives that #AIL(B,win, wout) is always greater
than or equal to 17−NB(win, wout) whenNB(win, wout)
is non-zero. Section 6 and Appendix A show that, for
a lot of usual S-Boxes, NB(win, wout) is often small
in the Hamming weight leakage model, and the inter-
esting Hamming weight pairs are the ones such that
NB(win, wout) is small. Indeed, in this case, the con-
straints on the Xi and Yi variables are strong, and
we obtain several linear equations (see Proposition 1).
Moreover, if the integer NB(win, wout) is very small
(typically ≤ 6 for an 8-bit bus) then some bits can even
be fixed, this will be discussed in Section 4.3.
Remark 3 Note that there are a lot of linear relations
because there are two Hamming weight leakages around
B. If only one Hamming weight leakage (input or out-
put) is added to the equations of B then the number






and is generally (if w 6= 0, n) too big to
fix some bits and to obtain interesting linear equations.
This situation is very similar to the Hamming distance
model (see Section 3.3).
The next section studies the Hamming distance leak-
age which is a more general model than the Hamming
weight model. Its main purpose is to study the rele-
vance of the Algebraic Immunity with Leakage and the
proposed invariant NB with a different leakage model.
3.3 Hamming distance leakage model
The Hamming distance model is often more suited than
the Hamming weight model to describe the power con-
sumption of a device (see [BCO04] or [MOP07] for in-
stance). Indeed, the power consumption of a microcon-
troller, for instance with CMOS technology, is typically
described by the number of modified bits in registers
or buses (due to the presence of many connected com-
ponents: capacitors, logic/sequential cells etc...). The
consumption of a transition from a value x to a value
y is then modeled by HD(x, y) = HW (x⊕ y).
The measured leakages in real devices strongly de-
pend on the implementation. Thus, many different sce-
narios could be considered with the Hamming distance
leakage model (for instance, the distance could be mea-
sured between different points). The aim of this analysis
being to study the influence of additional information
on the algebraic solving step, we do not necessarily seek
the most realistic scenarios. Instead, we especially want
to check the relevancy of the proposed analysis. In the
ASCA context, similar to the Hamming weight model
(Section 3.2), we will first assume that an initial on-line
phase provides the Hamming distances between input
and output of a black box B. We refer to Section 6 for
a discussion about this assumption and consideration
of other models.
As before, the Algebraic Immunity with Leakage is
equal to 1 for every black box B. This is a consequence
of Lemma 1 since the system of equations represent-
ing an Hamming distance is the system (1) where we
substitute Xi ⊕ Yi for Xi. Indeed, if we consider the
ideal Id ⊂ F2[X1, . . . , Xn, Y1, . . . , Yn] generated by the
equations representing B, the field equations and by Ld
(1) the equations representing the Hamming weight d
of the XOR between the input and the output, namely:
Id = 〈Ld(X1 + Y1, . . . , Xn + Yn) ∪ SB ∪ SField Eq.〉
then we have the following proposition
Proposition 3 Let G be the Gro¨bner basis of the ideal
Id for a graded monomial order. G contains at least one
linear polynomial.
Proof According to Lemma 1, we know that the ideal
Id always contains the polynomial
f = (X0 + Y0) + · · ·+ (Xn + Yn) + (d mod 2) ∈ Id
The rest of the proof is similar to the proof of Proposi-
tion 2. uunionsq
Then there is always at least one linear equation
when the Hamming distance equations are added to the
system of equations corresponding to B. In the same
way as previously, there could be many more in func-
tion of the Hamming distance. Once again, by Propo-
sition 1, the number of independent linear equations is
linked to the number of points which satisfy this Ham-
ming distance. Thus, we define NB in the case of the
Hamming distance by
NB(d) = #{x ∈ Fn2 s.t. HD(x,B(x)) = d}
Unfortunately, in contrary to the Hamming weight
model, there is rarely more than one linear polynomial
in the Gro¨bner basis, what is due to NB(d) which is
larger than previously (see Section 6 for the experi-
ments done for PRESENT and AES).
In the next section we will study more precisely the
influence of the number of independent linear relations
on the complete solving.
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4 Solving the complete system modeling the
block cipher
As explained in Section 2, the problem is modeled by a
system of equations which has a particular block diago-
nal structure. More precisely, it is composed of blocks of
equations which correspond to the cipher rounds with
the leakage information. Each block is composed of sys-
tems of equations corresponding to the black boxes (S-
boxes, MixColumns) and leakages of corresponding in-
put and output data. We can split the complete system
into small systems and locally study each of them. This
local study is described in Section 3. We showed that
the equations of the leakage model with the equations
modeling one black box could yield a lot of low degree
equations, such as linear equations, or could even give
values of intermediate variables. Thanks to this partic-
ular structure, we have developed an efficient solving
strategy.
4.1 Solving Strategy
The inputs of our off-line problem can be seen as a finite
sequence L of values corresponding to the leakages of
the successive 8-bit black boxes of the block cipher. In
order to efficiently solve the complete polynomial sys-
tem, we first seek the elements in L that provide the
greatest possible number of linear relations. To do so,
according to Section 3, we sort the sequence L by in-
creasing NB . Following this order, the polynomial sys-
tems corresponding to the first elements are those that
provide the most linear equations. Thus, rather than
computing directly a Gro¨bner basis of the complete sys-
tem, we first compute Gro¨bner bases of some of these
smaller systems. In a second step, we solve the complete
system with the additional linear relations computed
during the first step. This strategy based on splitting
allows us to have better control on the maximal degree
reached during the second step.
Remark 4 This strategy allows us to select some of the
leakage ordered pairs in L, in particular one could reject
the leakages with large NB and small confidence in their
measurements during the on-line phase.
4.2 A Sufficient Condition of Success
In the last step of the solving strategy, a polynomial
system with several independent linear equations has
to be solved. The efficiency of this step is strongly cor-
related with the number of these linear relations. More
precisely, the efficiency heavily depends on the number
n 35 47 56 64 69 78 90
P(RPRESENT ≥ n) 99% 90% 70% 50% 30 % 10% 1%
Fig. 1 Probability to obtain more than n linear equations
with one PRESENT’s round
of independent linear relations between the inputs and
the outputs of the black boxes B.
For computational feasibility, it is assumed that the
dispersion through a round of a block cipher is so impor-
tant that the rounds are supposed to be independent.
The black boxes of the same round are also supposedly
independent. Thus, under this assumption, for a given
block cipher based on a black box B, the total num-
ber of linear relations only depends on the local study
around B done in Section 2. From this local study, one
can compute the distribution of the number of linear
equations coming from the study of the polynomial sys-
tem of one round.
Example with the block cipher PRESENT and
Hamming weight leakage model.
In this example, the black box B is the 8-bit S-box
built from two PRESENT S-boxes. From the study
of the probability distribution of the random variable
LPRESENT (see Section 6) measuring the number of
linear relations obtained from the local study of B,
one can see that half of the possible leakage values
provide at least 8 linear independent relations. Thus,
the expected number of linear equations obtained from
the substitution layer of one round is equal to 8 ×
E(LPRESENT ) ' 64 for PRESENT and represents a
practical behavior. Hence, the expected number of lin-
ear equations is about the same size as the block length
for one round and n × k for the complete system with
n rounds with leakages.
From the probability distribution of LPRESENT ,
we computed the distribution of the random variable
RPRESENT measuring the number of linear relations
obtained with all S-boxes and all Hamming weight leak-
ages of one round of PRESENT. Figure 1 shows some
of these results. According to them, the probability of
obtaining at least 64 linear relations is about 50% with
PRESENT. Thus, the expected number of linear equa-
tions has a high probability of being reached even with
a small number of rounds with leakage information.
Considering these results, we propose a sufficient
condition for an effective Algebraic Side Channel At-
tack. This condition is defined in a very simple way.
Indeed, the local study of the non-linear part of a block
cipher seen as a black box done in Section 3 gives an
easy way to estimate the total number of low degree
equations. This local study relies on the new notion of
Algebraic Immunity with Leakage, which is itself linked
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to the function NB as proved in Section 2. This func-
tion is very easy to compute from the definition of the
black box and provides the following general condition.
Sufficient condition of success Let B be an n-bit
black box. If NB(l) (see Definition 3) is small enough
(say less than n) for half of the possible leakages l then
a block cipher based on B is vulnerable to an Algebraic
Side Channel Attack with Gro¨bner Basis method.
In a Gro¨bner basis point of view, this condition im-
plies (from Proposition 1) that at least half of the leak-
ages provide more than n independent linear relations.
Thus, the final polynomial system will be at least “half”
linearized and (generally) easy to solve. In practice, this
condition of success has been successfully applied for
different black boxes constructed from S-boxes of well-
known block ciphers. For instance, we showed that NB
is often small for PRESENT S-box with the Hamming
weight leakage model, which explained the linearization
of the full system of equation.
This sufficient condition of success can be expressed
more precisely in practice by mean of a complexity
bound. Indeed, the proposed invariant NB can be used
to compute the complexity of the exhaustive search on
inputs (and outputs) of the corresponding layer. Re-
call that NB(l) is equal to the number of possible input
(or output) values for a black box B giving the leak-
age l. Thus, for a given n-bit black box B, the number
of possible values decreases from 2n to NB(l) thanks
to the leakage l. For a fixed encryption and for a given
layer with black boxes B1 to Bm with the corresponding
known leakage l1 to lm, the cost of exhaustive search on
this layer is precisely equal to
∏m
i=1NBi(li). When the
possible values of NB are (almost) evenly distributed,
the expected value of NB is also a very good indicator
and could be used to compute the average complexity
of the exhaustive search of an input and an output of
a round. Once more, we could assume that the rounds,
as well as the boxes of a given round, are independent.
Thus, the expected number of possible input values of
the layer is E(NB)
m with m the number of boxes per
rounds. In this case, the sufficient condition of success
could be restated by saying that the block cipher is vul-
nerable to ASCA if this expected value implies that the
complexity to recover the secret key is less than the as-
sumed computing power of an attacker. This is usually
the case in practice for PRESENT with the Hamming
weight leakage model, where we have E(NB) ' 12.29
and the average complexity of the exhaustive search of
the layer input is E(NB)
8 ' 229 (by comparison with
a complexity of 264 without leakage information). This
condition is only sufficient because it does not consider
implications from one leakage to the entire system and
the ability of tools such that SAT solvers to exploit
them.
Such a condition of success explains why it is pos-
sible to attack a block cipher when all the leakages of
all the rounds are known and gives a first complex-
ity bound for this attack. On the other hand, the au-
thors of [RS09] showed that three or four consecutive
leakages rounds are sufficient to quickly solve the com-
plete polynomial system (see annex B where we re-
produce the experimental results presented in [RS09,
RSVC09]). Counting the number of linear equations
given by these rounds is not sufficient to explain the
efficiency of the method, in particular for the unknown
Plaintext and Ciphertext scenario and the similarity be-
tween these results and those obtained in the known PC
scenario. Moreover, the sufficient condition expressed in
terms of exhaustive search can be improved by taking
into account the implications between different rounds.
Thus, in the next section, we study the particular situa-
tion where the leakages correspond to a few consecutive
rounds.
4.3 Consecutive leakages
First we consider the basic case of two face to face black
boxes B1 and B2 of consecutive rounds (Figure 2). The
best case is when NBi (i = 1 and 2) is small enough
(<< n the bus size), such that the linear relations com-
ing from the local study at B1 and B2 successfully fixed
intermediate bits. For example, assume that two face to
face bits yi and xj in the output of B1 and the input of
B2 (see Figure 2) are known by the local study of B1
and B2 with Hamming weight leakages. The complete
system of equations contains the equations modeling
the permutation layer and the bitwise XOR (see Sec-
tion 2), hence, during the second step of the strategy,
the subkey bit kj is easily deduced from the knowledge
of the value of yi and xj . Once a subkey bit is fixed,
other subkey bits in other rounds can be found with the
key schedule equations.
Remark 5 This point of view explains why it is harder
to successfully attack the problem with unknown plain-
text and ciphertext when we do not know such consec-
utive leakages (see Appendix B when the number of
rounds of Hamming weight information is less than 15
for PRESENT, and less than 5 for AES).
Following our sufficient condition and the study done
in this section, the solving efficiency is due to a small
NB in average for the black box B. In the following,
we exhibit a family of black boxes which are as far re-
moved as possible from the condition of success and we








Fig. 2 Example of two consecutive rounds
verify experimentally that they are more resistant to
algebraic side channel attacks. The condition of success
exhibited in this section is not a necessary condition
but the results of the next section tend to show that it
is very close to be criterion of success.
5 Characterization of a family of resistant
S-Boxes
Generally in the design of block ciphers using a sub-
stitution-permutation networks, S-boxes are the non-
linear part. Thus, the S-boxes must be carefully chosen
to make the cipher resistant against cryptanalysis. In
our attacks, the S-boxes (seen as black boxes) leak in-
formation from the manipulated data. In this section,
we only consider the situation covered by the Hamming
weight model (i.e. a leakage l will be a couple of values
corresponding to the Hamming weight of the input and
output of the black box B). For the distance model
a study is done, for example, in [Pro05]. The knowl-
edge of this additional information enables us to model
this cipher component by a system of equations con-
taining #AIL linear relations. As seen in Section 3.2,
#AIL clearly depends on the Hamming weight pairs
but also on the black box. The expected value of the
number of such linear relations is very large (greater
than 7). These S-boxes are weak for our attacks and we
are looking for a criterion for more resisting S-boxes.
We study the influence of the black box on our criterion
NB(win, wout), which is linked to #AIL(B,win, wout).
For that, we study the extreme case represented by the
family of S-Boxes in complete contradiction with the
sufficient condition of success exhibited in Section 4.2.
Since NB(win, wout) is explicitly given as the car-
dinality of the sets {x ∈ Fn2 s.t. HW (x) = win and
HW (B(x)) = wout}, it is clear that a bijective black
box B maximizingNB(win, wout) for every possible pair
(win, wout), must be such that the sets HW
−1(win) and
B−1(HW−1(wout)) have precisely the same elements.























Actually, a bijective black box B maximizing
NB(win, wout) for every possible pair (win, wout), must
satisfy
win = wout or win = n− wout
Then such black box factors into
B(x) = pi(x)⊕ f(HW (x))(1, . . . , 1)
where pi is a permutation stable under the Hamming
weigth and f is a boolean function such that f(HW (x))
= f(n−HW (x)).
Example 3 The following table describes such an opti-
mal 4-bit S-Box:
x 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 A B C D E F
B(x) 0 8 1 C 2 6 9 B 4 5 3 D A E 7 F
Therefore, there are optimal black boxes in the sense
of maximizing NB for every possible leakage, and ex-
periments confirm that some of them are more resistant
to our attacks. However, it seems that such black boxes
are not resistant to differential and linear cryptanalysis.
In the particular case of an even bus size, we are able
to prove the following proposition:
Proposition 4 Let n be an even number and let as-
sume that the leakage model is the Hamming weight
one. The n-bit black boxes in a complete contradiction
with the sufficient condition of success (see Section 4.2)
for an ASCA, i.e. satisfying HW−1(win) =
B−1(HW−1(wout)), are not resistant to linear crypt-
analysis. Actually, affine components exist for these S-
boxes.
Proof Let B be an n-bit black box verifying the as-












Thus, win = wout or win = n − wout which implies
that wout ≡ win mod 2 in the case where n is an even
integer. Hence we have (1, . . . , 1) ·B(x) = (1, . . . , 1) · x
and the nonlinearity of B is equal to 0. uunionsq
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In the case where n is an odd number, we could
find some ASCA-resistant black boxes with a linearity
slightly less than 2n. However, all these found black
boxes stay weak against linear cryptanalysis. Hence,
the question arises of determining whether ASCA opti-
mally resistant S-boxes can reach a good nonlinearity.
But we were not able either to prove the inexistence
of ASCA optimally resistant black boxes with a strong
resistance against linear cryptanalysis, in spite of the
following rewriting using the Krawtchouk polynomials
Kn,w, which establishes a relation between the function
NB and the Walsh coefficient (essential for computing
the linearity of a box). Krawtchouk polynomials are
classical orthogonal univariate polynomials over the ra-


















and for all a ∈ Fn2 , we have∑
x∈Fn2 |HW (x)=w
(−1)a·x = Kn,w(HW (a)) (3)
By the inverse Fourier transform, we deduce from (3)





2n if HW (x) = w
0 otherwise
Finally, for all w,w′ = 0, . . . , n, we have
NB(w,w
′)











where BWb (a) :=
∑
x∈Fn2 (−1)
a·x+b·B(x) be the Walsh
transform of B.
Actually, as already proposed in [RS09], it seems
that one of the safest way to design a substitution box
resistant to all kinds of attacks is to increase the bus
size. Indeed, NB(win, wout) also depends on the bus size
n, and for all bijective black boxes, since NB(win, wout)
defines a partition of Fn2 we have∑
(win,wout)∈N2
NB(win, wout) = 2
n
This shows that, in general, NB(win, wout) grows expo-
nentially as n increases.
6 Experiments
In this part we show that the condition of success from
Section 4.2 is supported by the experiments (positive
and negative) we performed for PRESENT, AES and
for the resistant S-box given in Section 5. Following our
model described in Section 2, we build a complete sys-
tem of polynomial equations as a function of the target
cipher (PRESENT or AES) and as a function on the
sequence L of leakage information which are taken into
account. Since Magma [BCP97] provides an efficient im-
plementation of the Fauge`re F4 algorithm, we use this
computer algebra system for our experiments. For the
SAT attacks, we use CryptoMiniSat [SNC09], glucose2,
glueminisat, and plingeling which are the winners of the
SAT Race 2010 and SAT Race 2011.
6.1 Experiments against PRESENT using the
Hamming weight model
Here, the leakage comes from the inputs and outputs
of S-boxes (we see two consecutive 4-bit PRESENT S-
boxes as an 8-bit one).
PRESENT is a very simple Substitution-Permutation
Network designed by Bogdanov et al. [BKL+07] for
hardware efficiency and for extremely constrained en-
vironments. The non-linear layer uses a single 4-bits
S-box S which is applied 16 times in parallel in each
round. The action of this box is given by the following
table.
x 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 A B C D E F
S[x] C 5 6 B 9 0 A D 3 E F 8 4 7 1 2
Following the situation of [RS09], we assume that
the device leaks the Hamming weights of the values
commuting on its 8-bit bus. In this case, two S-boxes are
processed at the same time, which is represented by a 8-
bit black box B. From the definition of B one can easily
deduce the table 3 giving NB(win, wout) in function of
the input/output couples. We compare this table with
the one (see Table 4) given #AIL(B,win, wout) in func-
tion of the same couples. One can see thatNB(win, wout)
can give a good indicator when we are interested in
maximizing the number of independent linear polyno-
mials #AIL(B,win, wout) during an algebraic attack.
Even if #AIL(B,win, wout) is not rigorously inversely
proportional to NB(win, wout) it is close to be the case.
A counterexample for this reciprocity is given by
NB(3, 3) = 12 which is less than NB(2, 4) = 18 but
#AIL(B, 3, 3) = 5 < #AIL(B, 2, 4) = 8.
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PPPPPPwin
wout 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 8 0 0 0 0
2 0 0 2 2 18 4 2 0 0
3 0 0 8 12 8 20 8 0 0
4 1 2 3 24 7 22 6 4 1
5 0 4 4 16 12 8 8 4 0
6 0 2 6 2 12 2 4 0 0
7 0 0 4 0 4 0 0 0 0
8 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Fig. 3 NB(win, wout) where B is two PRESENT S-Boxes
PPPPPPwin
wout 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
0 16
1 9
2 15 15 8 13 15
3 9 5 9 5 9
4 16 15 14 2 11 3 12 13 16
5 13 13 2 7 10 11 13
6 15 12 15 7 15 14
7 13 13
8 16
Fig. 4 #AIL(B,win, wout) where B is two PRESENT S-
Boxes
Assume that the probability of appearing of an in-
put byte of the 8-bit black box B is 1/256. With Figures
3 and 4, we can easily compute the probability distribu-
tion of the random variable LB measuring the number
of linear relations that we obtain by adding the leak-
age information to our system. The Figure 5 presents
a chart providing the probabilities P(LB = k) inside
the sectors labeled by k. The integers k that give null
























Fig. 5 P(LB = k) for k with non zero probability and for HW
leakages
ability that at least 8 independent linear relations are
produced is about 50%. Moreover, the expected value
of LB is ' 7.9.
We also compare Table 3 with the one given the
number of fixed bits (see Table 6) in function of the
input/output couples. One can see that when NB is
small the number of fixed bits can be large.
PPPPPPwin
wout 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
0 0 0 0 0 16 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 0 0 8 10 0 4 8 0 0
3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
4 16 10 4 0 0 0 4 6 16
5 0 4 4 0 0 0 2 4 0
6 0 10 2 10 0 6 8 0 0
7 0 0 6 0 4 0 0 0 0
8 0 0 16 0 0 0 0 0 0
Fig. 6 Number of fixed bits with two PRESENT S-Boxes
We will now use all this knowledge to explain the
experiments behaviors observed during an algebraic at-
tack of PRESENT under different scenarios.
As in [RS09], the knowledge of all Hamming weight
pairs from the 31 rounds of PRESENT always leads
to successful SAT solver and Gro¨bner attacks, in both
cases known and unknown plaintext and ciphertext.
Note that in this experiment, we already must apply our
solving strategy (4.1). More precisely, we first have to
successively compute the Gro¨bner basis of each round
before computing the last Gro¨bner basis of the whole
system. Indeed, if we try to directly compute the Gro¨b-
ner basis of the system of equations modeling the initial
problem, then the maximum degree reached during the
computation is too big, and the computation is very
slow.
Similar experiments allow us to check Remark 3: we
explained that an important condition is the knowl-
edge of the couple of Hamming weights around the
S-box. So, we performed attacks on PRESENT with
only the Hamming weights of input (or output) data
of all S-Boxes. Our Gro¨bner basis solving strategy and
SAT solvers are much less efficient, rather than failed,
in this situation (which is very similar to the HD sce-
nario). Indeed, without the knowledge of the plaintext
and ciphertext, SAT solvers and Gro¨bner attacks al-
ways failed. It confirms that a large NB , which could
not fix enough intermediate bits (see Section 4.3), is
not able to find subkey bits. Otherwise, if the plaintext
and ciphertext were known, the low number of linear
equations often allow some SAT solvers to recover the
key. However, the solving step is very long with all used
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SAT solvers (once again comparable to the HD model)
and the Gro¨bner attack fails with an out of memory if
we take much than 2 or 3 rounds. These experiments
confirmed the necessity of always using weight couples.
Other experimental results confirmed that the num-
ber NB(win, wout) is a very good indicator to sort inter-
esting Hamming weight couples for an ASCA. These ex-
periments have checked Remark 4 for PRESENT. More
precisely, one can reject the leakages (win, wout) with
large NB(win, wout) without consequences on the suc-
cess rate. Conversely, if we reject the leakages (win, wout)
with smallNB(win, wout) then all Gro¨bner basis attacks
and all SAT attacks failed.
Following the condition of success, we also designed
theoretically more resistant S-boxes in Section 5. Ex-
periments with PRESENT, where we use such S-boxes
as a substitute for original S-boxes, are also intractable
(with both SAT and Gro¨bner ) which confirm that these
S-boxes are much more resistant to this kind of attack.
Thus, we are able to explain the experiments against
PRESENT in [RS09]. In particular, the study in Section
4.3 explained the successful attacks when we know con-
secutive leakages. Note that the success rates given in
[RS09,RSVC09] in the case of unknown plaintext and
ciphertext attacks with randomly distributed leakage
information (Appendix B) can be explained by the pi-
geonhole principle. For the example involving 31 rounds
of PRESENT, the success rate is greater than zero
when the number of rounds with leakages reaches ap-
proximately 15. By the pigeonhole principle, this corre-
sponds to the case where there are at least two consecu-
tive rounds with leakage and thus Section 4.3 explained
these experimental results.
6.2 Experiments against AES using the Hamming
weight model
Here, the 8-bit leakage comes from the inputs and out-
puts of S-boxes and Mixcolumns.
The same study of the AES S-box B also shows
(see Table 7 and Table 8) that NB(win, wout) is a very
good indicator when we are interested in maximizing
#AIL(B,win, wout) .
As before, we compute the probability distribution
of the random variable LB measuring the number of
linear relations that we obtain by adding the leakage
information to our system. The chart of the Figure 10
provides the probabilities P(LB = k) inside the sectors
labeled by k. The integers k that give null probability
are not shown.
Surprisingly, the probability that at least 8 indepen-
dent linear relations are produced is also about 50%,
PPPPPPwin
wout 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 2 0 1 3 2 0 0
2 0 2 3 8 5 4 4 2 0
3 1 1 4 17 16 10 5 2 0
4 0 3 9 11 21 16 9 1 0
5 0 1 7 10 19 14 3 2 0
6 0 0 3 7 5 8 4 0 1
7 0 1 0 2 2 1 1 1 0
8 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
Fig. 7 NB(win, wout) where B is the AES S-Box
PPPPPPwin
wout 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
0 16
1 15 16 14 15
2 15 14 9 12 13 13 15
3 16 16 13 2 2 7 12 15
4 14 8 6 2 2 8 16
5 16 10 7 2 3 14 15
6 14 10 12 9 13 16
7 16 15 15 16 16 16
8 16
Fig. 8 #AIL(B,win, wout) where B is the AES S-Box
PPPPPPwin
wout 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
0 0 0 0 0 16 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 10 0 16 6 12 0 0
2 0 10 7 2 3 2 6 10 0
3 16 16 2 0 0 0 2 10 0
4 0 10 0 0 0 0 2 16 0
5 0 16 1 0 0 0 5 8 0
6 0 0 6 1 3 1 6 0 16
7 0 16 0 10 8 16 16 16 0
8 0 0 0 16 0 0 0 0 0
Fig. 9 Number of fixed bits with the AES S-Box
and the expected value of LB is ' 7.3 which is almost
equal as for PRESENT.
In the same way as PRESENT, we will now use
all this knowledge to explain the experiments behav-
iors observed during an algebraic attack of AES under
different scenarios.
As in [RSVC09] and [RS09], the knowledge of all
Hamming weight pairs (i.e. around the S-boxes and
around the Mixcolumns) from the 10 rounds of AES
always leads to successful SAT and Gro¨bner attacks, in
the case of known plaintext and ciphertext. The ASCA
in unknown plaintext and ciphertext scenario is effec-
tive only with SAT solvers, the Gro¨bner computation
requiring too much memory space.
Note that we only took the Hamming weights of the
input and the output of the Mixcolumns step. Thus,























Fig. 10 P(LB = k) for k with non zero probability and for
HW leakages
the MixColumns transformation is seen as a black box
and then, contrary to the experiments described in the
article [RSVC09], previous ASCA are effective against
AES even if the MixColumns operation is implemented
as a table look-up. This difference of experimental re-
sults may be explained by the advances in SAT solvers
heuristics.
The Mixcolumns transformation being a linear step,
we also wonder whether its leakage was required. The
experiments with only the Hamming weights leakage
of the S-boxes (i.e. without leakage from MixColumns)
are effective with SAT solvers, even if the solving step
is much longer (in average a couple of hours against
several dozen seconds).
We also make experiments with the theoretically re-
sistant S-boxes designed in Section 6, which confirm
that AES with these S-boxes are more resistant to both
SAT and Gro¨bner attacks.
6.3 Experiments against PRESENT and AES using
the Hamming distance between input and output of
S-Boxes
In this model, similar to the Hamming weight model,
we assume that an initial on-line phase only provides
the 8-bit Hamming distances between input and output
of the S-boxes. It should be noted that using only the
Hamming distance between input and output of the S-
Boxes seems too restrictive, as well as being not very
realistic. Indeed, we should also assume that other dis-
tances are known, which of course would increase the
efficiency and success rate of the attack. However, this
model stays interesting because the purpose of these
d 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
NB(d) 0 0 16 56 81 64 30 8 1
#AIL(B, d) 0 0 10 3 1 1 1 9 16
Nb fixed bits 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 16
Fig. 11 HD model and 2 PRESENT’s S-Boxes
d 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
NB(d) 0 12 31 48 67 59 32 7 0
#AIL(B, d) 0 5 1 1 1 1 1 10 0
Nb fixed bits 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
Fig. 12 HD model and AES S-Box
experiments is above all to confirm the relevance of the
proposed criteria.
We already foretold (see Section 3.3) that an ASCA
will be much more difficult in this case. Actually, there
is always at least one linear equation (see Proposition 3)
when the Hamming distance equations are added to
the system of equations corresponding to PRESENT
or AES S-boxes but, unfortunately, in contrary to the
Hamming weight model, there is rarely more than one.
This fact can be explained for PRESENT and AES
by studying the functions NPRESENT and NAES respec-
tively. The Tables 11 and 12 detail the distribution of
these functions and the corresponding #AIL for AES
and PRESENT S-boxes.
As one can see, the functions NPRESENT and NAES
often take very large values. Thus, the number of ex-
pected linear relations will be very small. Moreover, one
can guess that the number of linear relations for AES
will be less than for PRESENT (since there are more
large values for NAES than for NPRESENT). Actually,
the expected number of linear relations is about 2.3 for
PRESENT and 1.4 for AES S-Boxes (with an assump-
tion on equiprobability distribution of input bytes),
which is much less than in the case of the Hamming
weight model (between 7 and 8, as seen above). It be-
comes manifest that a Gro¨bner attack will be much
more difficult in this case. Actually, Gro¨bner attack in
this situation needs too much memory to be practical.
In practice, we were not able to mount a complete
Gro¨bner attack with 31 rounds of PRESENT (an at-
tack on 3 rounds of PRESENT has been successful,
but an out of memory error occurs with more rounds).
Nonetheless, in known plaintext and ciphertext scena-
rio, the constraints on the intermediate variables given
by the Hamming distance equations seem sometimes
sufficient for SAT solvers that we used. The solving
time seems strongly dependent on the heuristics of the
SAT solver and so it is difficult to correlate them to the
number of linear equations or their distribution.
On the other hand, as we suspected by studying
the function NAES, every ASCA experiments on AES
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with the Hamming distance leakage model have failed.
This fact can be explained by the more complex al-
gebraic structure of AES (including its keyschedule)
which seems to avoid ASCA with only the Hamming
distances between the inputs and outputs of S-Boxes.
Moreover, the chance to find the value of an inter-
mediate bit is very low, which explains the negative
experiments in unknown plaintext and ciphertext sce-
nario in this case.
6.4 Experiments against PRESENT using the
Hamming distance between consecutive encryptions
An interesting extension would be also to consider the
leakages between consecutive encryptions of different
plaintexts. This model provides, for a given spot, the
Hamming distances between successive encryptions. As
usual, we consider the 8-bit Hamming distances be-
tween inputs of all S-boxes from two consecutive en-
cryptions with PRESENT, with a fixed secret key. The





Fig. 13 Two encryptions with the same key
As presented in Figure 13, this model provides the
Hamming distances HD(x1 ⊕ k, x2 ⊕ k) = HD(x1, x2)
and HD(y1, y2) = HD(B(x1⊕ k), B(x2⊕ k)). Thus, at
the first round for instance, x1 and x2 are bytes of the
plaintexts, then we assume that they are known and
only the Hamming distance of the outputs are inter-
esting (the same goes with the Hamming distances of
inputs at the last round). In this particular case, for
given x1 and x2, our invariant NB(dout) is defined by
{k ∈ F82 s.t. HD(B(x1 ⊕ k), B(x2 ⊕ k)) = dout}, which
is very similar to the previous Hamming distance be-
tween input and output of S-Boxes (Section 6.3). For
instance, Figure 15 shows the values of NB(dout) and
#AIL(B, dout) when x1=0xD8 and x2=0xB1. Notice
that the number of linear equations is often large de-
spite the fact that NB is also large. But, many of these
equations are just equalities between the 3n unknown
bits, hence are useless for fixing bits of the key.
nb of rounds 8 10 12 15 16∏
NB last round 247 248 250 247.7 247.7
cryptominisat-2.9 2012 9984 2728 4581 19336
glucose2 1600 2794 12919 2716 17756
nb of rounds 19 20 21 30 50∏
NB last round 243.5 249 241 247.4 247.2
cryptominisat-2.9 929 4080 2266 5973 11085
glucose2 4999 11144 2648 5050 2240
Fig. 14 Solving times in second of experiments against
PRESENT using the Hamming distance between consecutive
encryptions
dout 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
NB(dout) 0 0 32 48 64 64 32 16 0
#AIL(B, dout) 0 0 15 12 9 9 14 20 0
Nb fixed bits 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0
Fig. 15 HD between 2 consecutive encryptions with
PRESENT when x1=0xD8 and x2=0xB1
In practice, we have only done experiments on the
very simple block cipher PRESENT with the fixed plain-
texts and the fixed key shown in annexe C. The re-
sults are reported in figure 6.4. In the experiments we
have done, the SAT solver attacks worked when there
are leakages in all PRESENT’s rounds, although the
computation time can be very different between two
instances. Following the condition of success, the ex-
haustive search on the 64 used bits of the last subkey
is reduced to a complexity between 241 and 250. The
SAT solvers are much faster since they do not only use
information of the last round, but also from previous
rounds (and especially from the first round) thanks to
the simplicity of the PRESENT key schedule.
As in Section 6.3, the Gro¨bner attack needed too
much memory to solve the system with this model.
Moreover, leakages on the round, on the last round,
plaintext and ciphertext are all mandatory; all attacks
without one of these have failed.
7 Conclusion
In this article we introduced a new criterion for the ef-
fectiveness of ASCA. This criterion rely on a new notion
of algebraic immunity. In order to simplify the analysis
of a given block cipher we introduce an invariant re-
lated to this block cipher. This invariant is a function
which can be easily defined and computed from the def-
inition of the given block cipher (no need of advanced
algebra). From this new invariant we exhibit a sufficient
condition of success of an ASCA and we were able to
theoretically explain the experiments done by Renauld,
Standaert and Veyrat-Charvillon in [RS09,RSVC09] by
studying the distribution of the values taken by this
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function. Experimental results confirmed our sufficient
condition success and showed that it is a good condition
for both effective Gro¨bner and SAT solver attacks. This
understanding allowed us to design S-boxes optimally
resistant to ASCA following this condition. However,
we observe that these S-boxes are weak for linear and
differential cryptanalysis, which confirms, as observed
in [RS09], that a large bus size can be prescribed to
design a resistant block ciphers. Following our new in-
variant for a block cipher, and with our experiments,
we also show the influence of the leakage model over
ASCA. In this paper, we studied the Hamming weight
and Hamming distance leakage models, but other good
leakage models can be selected. Some results on the in-
fluence of the leakage model over ASCA have already
been presented (see [RS10]). They are all rely on ex-
perimental studies using SAT solvers, we will address
the comparison of our approach with them in a future
research paper. More generally, extending the attack to
deal with erroneous equations is one of our long-range
research aims. The well understanding of the algebraic
phase of this attack done in this article is already a first
step in this direction.
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A Annex : A study of several S-Boxes and 8-bit
Hamming weight leakage model
In this part, we provide tables showing the distribution
of NB for different S-Boxes with the Hamming weight
leakage model. All the results show that these S-boxes
are weak against an ASCA.
A.1 CAMELLIA S-Boxes
CAMELLIA [AIK+00] is a block cipher developed by
NTT and Mitsubishi in 2000. It is a Feistel cipher and
uses four 8-bit S-Boxes. S-Box1 is given by a table and
S-Box2, S-Box3 and S-Box4 are defined using S-Box1
as follows:
S-Box2[X] = S-Box1[X]≪ 1
S-Box3[X] = S-Box1[X]≪ 7
S-Box4[X] = S-Box1[X≪ 1]
where the symbol ≪ correspond to left rotation op-
eration. Because of these definitions, it is easy to see
that the four S-boxes have the same Hamming weights
distribution. Thus, the Figures 16, 17 and 18 equally
correspond to the four S-boxes.
PPPPPPwin
wout 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 1 3 3 1 0 0 0
2 0 1 3 6 6 7 2 3 0
3 1 0 3 15 16 16 4 1 0
4 0 4 12 11 19 14 8 1 1
5 0 2 5 11 17 10 8 3 0
6 0 0 3 7 8 5 5 0 0
7 0 1 1 2 1 2 1 0 0
8 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
Fig. 16 NB(win, wout) where B is one of the CAMELLIA
S-Boxes
PPPPPPwin
wout 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
0 16
1 16 14 14 16
2 16 14 11 11 10 15 14
3 16 14 3 2 2 13 16
4 13 5 6 2 3 9 16 16
5 15 12 6 2 7 9 14
6 14 10 9 12 12
7 16 16 15 16 15 16
8 16



























Fig. 18 P(LB = k) for k with non zero probability and for
HW leakages
A.2 SMS4 S-Box
SMS4 [Off06] is a block cipher used in the Chinese
WLAN National Standard. It uses an 8-bit S-Box given
by a table. The following Figures show its Algebraic Im-
munity with Hamming weights Leakage.
PPPPPPwin
wout 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
1 0 0 1 1 4 2 0 0 0
2 0 1 4 7 9 4 1 2 0
3 0 2 7 12 10 14 8 3 0
4 1 2 6 23 16 14 7 1 0
5 0 2 6 8 21 11 5 2 1
6 0 0 2 3 9 7 7 0 0
7 0 1 1 2 1 3 0 0 0
8 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Fig. 19 NB(win, wout) where B is the SMS4 S-box
PPPPPPwin
wout 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
0 16
1 16 16 13 15
2 16 13 10 8 13 16 15
3 15 10 5 7 3 9 14
4 16 15 11 2 3 3 10 16
5 15 11 9 3 6 12 15 16
6 15 14 8 10 10
7 16 16 15 16 14
8 16
Fig. 20 #AIL(B,win, wout) where B is the SMS4 S-box


























Fig. 21 P(LB = k) for k with non zero probability and for
HW leakages. The expected value of LB is ' 7.7.
B Success rate of ASCA taken from [RSVC09,
RS09]
We reproduce the following figures 22 and 23 corre-
sponding to the results of ASCA with the SAT solver
zChaff against PRESENT and AES presented in [RS09,
RSVC09].
Fig. 22 31-round PRESENT, partial WH leakages
Fig. 23 Success rate of the attacks against an unprotected
implementation of the AES in function of the amount of ex-
ploited leakages. One round of side-channel information is
equivalent to 84 known Hamming weights
C Plaintexts and key used in experiments of
section 6.4
Plaintexts and key used in section 6.4 for PRESENT
are shown in hexadecimal notation.
key CF708A5E 7AC7F066 3FBA
first plaintext 1A3759CA 97F9A3A9
second plaintext 64CB8CB9 DBC97346
